Holdings by issue
The same decisions as the tracker, organized by the question rather than by the case. Every answer links to the case file it comes from.
Drawn from published decisions and orders. Where a point is unsettled or in tension, it says so. This is general information about published decisions, not legal advice, and no summary here substitutes for reading the order itself.
Anti-SLAPP · UPEPA
What counts as a matter of public concern?
Construed broadly enough to reach criticism alleging that a person harmed others. The district court had held that a parent’s statements at a school board meeting were not on a matter of public concern; the Supreme Court disagreed.
Does public comment qualify if the topic is not being deliberated?
The district court reasoned that statements made during a public comment period, on concerns not under consideration at the meeting, fell outside the act. That reasoning did not survive review.
How is the prima facie determination reviewed?
For correctness, with facts and reasonable inferences viewed most favorably to the nonmovant.
Does the act reach conduct alleged to be criminal?
A district court held UPEPA does not protect criminal conduct such as stalking, true threats of violence, or targeted harassment, reasoning that the alleged conduct, if proven, would not be protected activity. Note the tension: Mackey asks whether the claim is asserted against the movant for protected activity, not whether the alleged conduct turns out to be protected.
Jones Smith v. StembridgeMackey v. Krause2025 UT 37, 575 P.3d 1162
Can a motion succeed as to some claims and not others?
Yes. Partial relief is a normal outcome. Two claims were dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case and the remainder were remanded.
How far does a fee award reach?
Only the work reasonably necessary to prosecute the special motion, not the entire litigation. An award of roughly $394,000 covering essentially all work in the case was reversed. A district court reached similar reasoning earlier, cutting a request of $84,137.80 to $20,000 because the questions the motion raised, and the procedures for answering them, are set out in the act.
Aston v. Chronicle-Progress LLC2026 UT 7, 2026 WL 900920Borys v. Ballard (Katherine Ballard's special motion)
Does the act reach claims that are not called defamation?
Yes. In Borys the plaintiffs said in their opposition that they had not brought a defamation action and were not suing over what the speaker said on two shows. The court applied the act anyway. Once one paragraph was set aside as conclusory, every remaining claim rested on her public statements. What the claims are based on controls, not what they are named.
What may the court consider in ruling on a UPEPA motion?
In Whitehead the court read Section 78B-25-106's command as plain language: the court shall consider the pleadings, the briefing, and any evidence that could be considered on summary judgment, even when dismissal rests on failure to state a claim. The order acknowledges this deviates from how other jurisdictions read the uniform act.
Whitehead v. Reyes; Ballard and Operation Underground Railroad
Vexatious requester
Can an agency petition against several requesters at once?
No. Section 209 uses singular terminology throughout and requires an individualized, fact-specific showing as to each respondent. The definition of “person” as a combination acting in concert does not carry into the section.
Office of the Lieutenant Governor v. Clara, Maragani, Clawson and Lyman
Is request volume by itself enough?
No, in both directions. A petition succeeded on 21 requests where the finding rested on threatening communications, and failed on more than 200.
Tooele City v. Kevin SullivanUniversity of Utah v. Ian Cooperstein
Do requests made before the statute took effect count?
No. Section 209 took effect May 3, 2023, and requests predating enactment cannot be weighed retroactively. That alone defeated one petition.
How much weight do allegations of hostile communications carry?
They need corroboration. One decision declined to credit an agency’s evidence of hostile communications because it rested on uncorroborated testimony, while documented threats carried a petition that the request count could not.
Office of the Utah State Treasurer v. Brady EamesTooele City v. Kevin Sullivan
Does the purpose behind the requests matter?
Yes. Requests found to have an articulated public purpose, evidenced by the audits and statutory reforms they prompted, could not be deemed an abuse of the right of access.
Office of the Lieutenant Governor v. Clara, Maragani, Clawson and Lyman
What shortens an order?
Public-interest value in some requests, good-faith participation, letters of support, and the absence of any prior petition. A request for the statutory maximum was cut to six months on a record of 435 requests; another was cut from twelve months to seven.
Utah County v. Mark AllenOffice of the Utah State Treasurer v. Brady Eames
What happens if the respondent does not appear?
The decisionmaker noted it had no choice but to accept the agency’s evidence at face value. Nothing in the statute delays a decision because a respondent stays silent.
UPEPA in federal court
Does UPEPA apply in federal court at all?
Undecided, and the question has now evaded review at both levels. No District of Utah ruling has adjudicated it: three decisions applied UPEPA because no party disputed it, and in the one case where the parties did dispute it the court expressly declined to decide, resolving the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) instead. The Tenth Circuit was squarely presented with the question in Lichfield and held it waived, because the appellant had argued the opposite below.
UHS of Provo Canyon v. BlissSunwest Bank v. Gannett Co. and Journal SentinelLichfield v. Kubler and NetflixThe Preserve v. Kamas City
What happened when the applicability question reached the Tenth Circuit?
It was not reached. In Lichfield the appellant argued on appeal that state anti-SLAPP laws do not apply in federal diversity actions under Erie, invoking Los Lobos Renewable Power v. AmeriCulture, 885 F.3d 659 (10th Cir. 2018), which held New Mexico's anti-SLAPP statute procedural and inapplicable. The court applied the invited error doctrine: in the district court the same party had argued that Utah's statute did apply under Erie and asked the court to run the analysis through Rule 12(b)(6). Having induced that approach, he could not complain of it, and both anti-SLAPP arguments were treated as waived. The fee award stood.
What standard governs a UPEPA motion in federal court?
A two-step analysis announced in Bliss and adopted in Sunwest: first whether UPEPA applies to the action, then whether the plaintiff failed to state a claim, judged under Rule 12(b)(6) because Section 78B-25-107(1)(c)(ii)(A) mirrors it.
UHS of Provo Canyon v. BlissSunwest Bank v. Gannett Co. and Journal Sentinel
Does dismissal under UPEPA run with prejudice in federal court?
Not so far. In Sunwest the movants conceded, and the court accepted, that the with-prejudice command of Section 78B-25-107(1) conflicts with the Federal Rules; dismissal ran without prejudice. In state court the same section produced dismissal with prejudice in Whitehead, where a co-defendant moving under Rule 12(b)(6) was dismissed without prejudice in the same order.
Sunwest Bank v. Gannett Co. and Journal SentinelWhitehead v. Reyes; Ballard and Operation Underground Railroad
Which state's anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court?
Open. In Lichfield the movants invoked both California's statute and UPEPA; the district court held the outcome identical under either, declined to conduct a choice-of-law analysis, and granted relief under both. The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground that no challenged statement was capable of defamatory meaning, and did not reach the choice-of-law question.